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5.04 The Death Penalty
NOTE

Because the death penalty was so influential in its development, the law of
homicide cannot be thoroughly understood without considering the subject of
capital punishment. The question of whether or not the State is justified in taking
an offender's life has for centuries been fraught with controversy. Moreover, the
law on the subject has become enormously complicated as the courts have
attempted to assure that the death penalty is fairly administered.
These materials can do no more than highlight some of the main moral and legal
issues in hopes that the reader will pursue matters in more depth on her own. In
considering the moral and policy dimensions of the death penalty, much of the
material on the justification of punishment in general in Chapter 2 should be kept
in mind. Justificatory issues are again taken up in this Chapter because these issues
are treated in the capital punishment context by a special and voluminous body of
literature.
[A]
[1]

Moral and Policy Issues
Retribution

Lempert, DESERT AND DETERRENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF TIIE
MORAL
BASES OF TIIE CASE FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

79 Mich. L. Rev. 1177-86 (1981)

Those who make out a moral case for the death penalty argue in a variety of ways
that those who kill others deserve to die. Indeed, to some it is our willingness to
execute the murderer which affirms the high value that all participants in the
debate place on human life. This is the essence of what is usually called the
retributivist position. The moral argument against the death penalty starts with the
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principle that it is wrong intentionally to take human life. For those who regard this
principle as an absolute, the fact that it is wrong to kill does not make it right to
take the murderer's life. Opponents of the death penalty correctly point out that in
an era when the "eye for an eye" approach to punishment has been abandoned for
almost every crime, no self-evident principle demands that it be retained for
homicide. They also make the more debatable argument that the state's action in
taking a life degrades the values it allegedly asserts.
Both sides of the argument from morality are concerned with issues of justice. No
principle of retribution allows the taking of an innocent life. Nor does the just
desert theory allow personal characteristics such as sex, race, or national status to
dominate indicia of moral culpability in determining punishment. Retributivists
justify the death penalty despite substantial evidence that it has been inequitably
applied by arguing that inequitable application is not inherent in the penalty, and
that it is better that some receive their just deserts, however biased the sample
executed, than that none do. For some opponents of capital punishment the
inconsistency with which it is applied is enough to condemn it. These opponents
need not confront the question of whether it is ultimately just to execute the
murderer, for regardless of ultimate deserts, extreme penalties cannot be allowed
so long as aspects of personal disadvantage play an important part in determining
who from among an equally culpable lot will be subject to the extreme sanction.

There is no necessary connection between moral positions on the justice of
capital punishment and empirical judgments as to whether executions deter, but,
not surprisingly, moral opponents find comfort in evidence that executions do not
deter while moral supporters are heartened by those studies that suggest they do. It
is difficult for those whose essential case against the death penalty rests on the
value of life to maintain their positions if an execution in fact trades one guilty life
for several innocent ones. Even the argument from equality is clouded if the
execution of each killer, however inequitably each is selected from among a larger
number, prevents the death of several innocent people. Since the same features of
social class which make one peculiarly eligible for capital punishment make one
disproportionately likely to be a homicide victim, there may even be a kind of rough
justice within classes if executions deter.
Although retributivists trace their heritage to Kant and before him to the Bible,
utilitarianism is pervasive enough in modem thought that most retributivists would
be troubled if a plausible case could not be made for deterrence. Death by
execution is both brutal and final. It is hard to make the case for such a penalty
when the only end promoted is the unprovable intuition that it is just. Nevertheless,
modem retributivists have been less concerned than their opponents with the
evidence bearing on deterrence. This may in part be because until recently there
was virtually no empirical evidence that gave them comfort. Indeed, a desire to
justify capital punishment on grounds other than deterrence has probably
contributed to the revival of retributivist theories of punishment. The retributivist
justification is possible - although nondeterrence be proven - because justice,
however intuitive its grounding, is itself a valued end. Thus, the argument from
justice does not necessarily take us beyond the questions of whether an offender
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deseives execution. The opposing moral claim, from the value of life, pulls us
almost irresistibly to the question of whether taking an offender's life will be
compensated by the preseivation of lives that would otherwise be lost to murder the empirical question addressed by the research on deterrence.

Once we acknowledge that not everyone who kills another should die - and
virtually all modem retributivists acknowledge this - doubts about the fairness of
the process by which we select those we execute arise. I have already mentioned the
difficulties some see in justifying executions when the poor or the black are overselected for the ultimate punishment, but even less invidious inconsistencies must
trouble the retributivist. For absent some self-evident principle separating murderers who deseive to die from those who do not, a principled basis for retributivism
may only be determined inductively. If inconsistent sentencing prevents the
derivation of a socially validated principle, the person who applauds the execution
of the murderer is applauding what is literally unprincipled state action. While
unprincipled state action may be more common than most of us would like, we
usually try to avoid theories which, when applied, lead us to applaud it.
If there is solace for the retributivist, it is in his sense that the state's lack of
principle leads it to spare life rather than to take it. People who deserve to die but
are spared death can hardly prick one's conscience. While this view may satisfy
some moralists who would otherwise have qualms about espousing an inevitably
capricious system of capital punishment, it offers nothing to the skeptic. When one
criminal is executed and another of apparently equal culpability spared, there is no
self-evident reason why the sparing and not the execution is wrong. When a state
cannot act consistently in such an important matter as determining who shall die,
those who invoke moral philosophy to demand that the state be allowed to make
that determination should be able to point to a consensually validated principle
which assures us that the inconsistency is benign.

Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of the innocent which
inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed. It is true that documented cases in
which the wrong person is executed are quite rare, and likely to remain so. But, as a
purely philosophical matter, thii; is of little help to the retributivist. Retributivism,
on its own terms, allows life to be taken only when death is deserved; it does not
tolerate killing as a means to some greater social good. Retributivists are proud of
their Kantian heritage, which demands that life be treated only as an end. Thus,
however good a just punishment system and however much such a system demands
the death penalty, the philosophy of retributivism apparently forbids the sacrifice of
innocent lives as a condition for the maintenance of such a system. Ideally, of
course, a system of capital punishment would not take innocent lives, but we know
as a statistical matter that if a state executes often enough, some innocent lives will
be lost. Although it may be a comfort not knowing what lives will be mistakenly
taken, nothing about retributivism allows us to sacrifice the lives of unknown
innocents in the interest of just vengeance.
As I have noted, few modem retributivists believe that all killers deserve death.
They respect the law's determination that capital punishment should be reseived
for the most morally culpable: those who fully intended, and perhaps rejoiced in,
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the suffering and death they inflicted and who, in some meaningful sense, could
have done otherwise. Moral culpability, thus conceived, is a subjective state. To
truly determine who are the most evil and thus the most deserving of death one
would have to search people's minds. Our inability to do so means that in deciding
whether to inflict the death penalty we often attend more to the circumstances of
the crime than to the circumstances of the criminal. The person who slays in a
peculiar or brutal way is more likely to receive the death penalty than one who
dispatches his victim with a single bullet, yet the former may have been insane
under all but the narrowest legal test while the latter was cool and calculating.
Indeed, the former may have been insane even under any legal test. While the
mistaken conviction of those who have not killed is certainly rare, the mistaken
allocation of responsibility to those who have killed may be uncomfortably common.
To the retributivist one mistake is almost as bad as another, for in most retributivist
schemes the unpremeditated murderer or the insane killer no more deserves to die
than the innocent victim of a misidentification. In arguing from a retributivist
philosophy to an actual system of state executions, retributivists are again
advocating a system that will work substantial injustice as measured by the
standards of the philosophical system they espouse.
The time lag between the time of the crime and the time of execution also poses
problems for retributivism. Executions are justified only when the offender
deserves to die. Assuming that all those sentenced to death deserved to die at the
time they committed the crimes for which they were sentenced, it does not follow
that they deserve death at the time it arrives. People so change with their
experiences that one may sensibly conceive of individuals as different people
deserving different fates at different points in time. Being on death row may be an
experience that is especially likely to promote such a change in moral identity.
In short, there is a fundamental irony to the usual retributivist position. Basic
principles of moral justice that are believed to justify or even demand the death of
those who maliciously kill others are necessarily offended by the attempt to impose
a system of state executions in an imperfect world. The emphasis that retributivists
place on human beings as ends and not as means, the high value they place on
innocent human life, and their insistence that retributivism (unlike revenge)
respects the bounds of law combine to form a philosophy from which one cannot
derive a policy that trades the wrongful execution of a few for the proper execution
of many. Capital punishment implements such a policy. Conversely, any policy
derived from a philosophy that is rooted in our intuitions regarding justice will be
suspect if the system it prescribes distributes rewards or punishments in an
invidious or inconsistent fashion. Capital punishment is such a system.
The preceding discussion focuses on the logic of deriving a system of capital
punishment from the premises of retributivism. As such, it speaks to the scholarly
debate but does not address the more primitive appeal of retributivism. When one
person wantonly kills another we are - if our senses have not been jaded by
murder after murder - outraged. Retribution in the form of killing the offender
seems like an honorable thing to do.
Why do we feel there is honor in repaying death with death? I believe the reasons
are largely cultural. Once we understand them we will see how it is possible -
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injustices aside - to be attracted by retributivism while simultaneously opposing
capital punishment.
Both our history and fiction are replete with characters and communities that are
thought to have acted admirably in securing the death of grievous offenders. But it
is not the fact of vengeful killing that we admire. Rather, it is the process by which
retnbution is achieved. We honor individuals not because they redress some cosmic
balance sheet, but because they risk their lives for an idea of justice. The Arthurian
epic nicely highlights the way in which the degree of honor depends on the element
of personal risk. The legend is also interesting for its message that the honor sought
by the avenging champion is secondary to that which may be found in search of the
holy.
In the case of communities the infliction of death has, historically, a different
meaning. The pursuit and execution of criminals were cooperative endeavors that
brought communities together to reaffirm their central values. It is not the fact that
a death was repaid with a death which is salutary; rather, it is the process necessary
to bring this about. Just as the linkage of a positive reinforcer with a neutral
stimulus will give the stimulus a positive quality, so do the efforts associated with
past accounts of retribution give retributivism its lingering good name. But once the
state assumes the burden of executing, the character of the retributive process is
fundamentally changed. There is no honor in watching the state execute one who in
the past would have been a just target of the watcher's vengeance, nor does honor
attach to the person who sets a noose or straps a convict into a chair. The meaning
of executions has also changed considerably for communities. Specialized law
enforcement means that citizens no longer have to come together to secure
retribution, and the execution itself has become a source of passionate controversy
rather than the occasion for a reassertion of communal solidarity.

